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ledged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, March 9th 1871,
and recorded in Deed Book J. A. H., No. 123, p. 442.
Here is an act quietly done, and unknown except to a few
individuals, of historical interest, and of great beneficence, and
fittingly crowns the honorable dealings of all the Penn proprietaries with their settlers and successors. For more than a century, few even in the legal profession have understood the precise
nature of the title and the powers of the Penns to the soil in
Pennsylvania; and they have always been so honorably represented as to give to settlers and purchasers entire confidence
withoat inquiry into the wills, articles of agreement, and marriage
settlements of the family, few of which were of record or accessible within the province or state, and were first got together and
printed by Williaum Henry Rawle, Esq., in 1870. It was not
known until then what Would be the disposition of the heir coming
through a female branch, whether to attempt to take advantage
of defects and omissions or to confirm titles made by his predecessors, because he was wholly unknown to us. The deed above
recited sufficiently proves that to William Stuart, Esq., we owe
thanks and gratitude, and that we should hold his name and
memory in honor, in common with all the Penns in their relations with the people of Pennsylvania.
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Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
CHARLOTTE D. LORD v. TOWN OF LITCHFIELD.
The statute of 1702 with regard to gifts for charitable uses provides that all

lands and estates that have been or shall be given by the General Assembly or by
any town or person for the maintenance of the ministry of the gospel or for any
other public and charitable use, shall for ever remain and be continued to such
use, and shall be exempt from the payment of taxes. Held, that this statute did
not constitute a contract between the state and either the donors or the donees of
such charitable gifts, that the property so given should for ever be exempt from
taxation, and that therefore a statute making it taxable in certain cases, was not

unconstitutional,
If to he regarded as such a contract, a lease of the property for 999 years for
a gross sum, without a reservation of rent, would be such a violation of the con-

dition of the contract that the state would no longer be bound by it.

LORD v. LITCHFIELD.
The case of Landon v. Litcfield, 11 Conn. 251, overruled. Also the cases
of Atwater v. Woodbridge, 6 Conn. 223, and Osborne v. Humphrey, 7 Conn. 335.
The present suit was brought by the owner of lands claimed to be exempt from
taxation under the Act of 1702, to recover money, compulsorily paid for such tax.
The land in question was the same land held in the case of Landon v. Litchfield to
be exempt from taxation under that statute, and the sole question in the present
case was as to its liability to taxation. An act had been passed in 1859, since
that decision, making such lands taxable where conveyed to other parties and. no
longer productive of income to the original donee, as was the case with the lands
in question. Held, that the judgment in the case of Landon v. Litchfield did not
estop the defendants from claiming the lands to be taxable, 1st, because the
record in that case did not show that that precise point was decided, and 2d,
because the Act of 1859 made the question a different one, it then being as to the
liability of the land to taxation under the law of that time and now as to its
liability under the law of the present time.
A statement of the facts of a case by a judge of the Superior Court for the
purpose of reserving the case for the advice of the Supreme Court, is not a part
of the record in the case.

for money paid, to recover the amount of certain
taxes paid under compulsion and claimed to have been illegally
laid. The Superior Court found the following facts.
The original deed from a committee of the towns of Hartford,
Windsor, and certain inhabitants of Farmington, dated April
27th 1719, granted to the first settlers of the town of Litchfield,
among other things, "tiree home lots with the divisions of land
to be laid out thereunto, and the whole of said three lots to be
three-sixtieth parts of the whole plantation, to be and remain
for the uses following, and no other use and purpose whatsoever,
namely,-one home lot, with the divisions and commons thereto
pertaining, to be given and granted to the minister that shall be
first ordained in the said plantation by the choice and approbation of the major part of the inhabitants thereof, to be and
remain to him and his heirs for ever; one lot, with the divisions
and commons, to be and remain for ever to and for the use and
improvement of the said first minister and his successors in the
work of the ministry in the said place; and the other of said
three lots to be and remain for ever to be improved by the inhabitants of the said plantation to the best advantage, for the support and maintenance of the school for the well educating of the
children in the said place."
In 1745, under the second clause of the foregoing extract, a
piece of land situated on the east side of North street, in the
village of Litchfield, containing thirty-six acres, was "surveyed
out to the ministry."
AsSUMPSIT
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At a meeting of the inhabitants of Litchfield, February 26th,
1753, it was ",voted to give Rev. Judah Champion a call to settle
among us in the ministry." Also "voted to give to Mr. Champion £2000 in old tenor money for his settlement, and £800 per
annum old tenor money for his salary, provided he settle as a
minister."
At a meeting holden June 14th 1753, it was "voted, to lease
out so much of the parsonage right of land for nine hundred and
ninety-nine years as to answer and pay the settlement already
voted to Mr. Champion,"'and a committee of three was appointed
to execute the lease.
The following lease to Mr. Champion was executed by the
committee :"To all people to whom these presents shall come-Greeting:
Know ye that we, Ebenezer Marsh, Edward Phelps, and Supply
Strong, of the town and county of Litchfield, in the colony of
Connecticut, being chosen and appointed a committee by the inhabitants of the said town to lease to the Rev. Judah Champion the
home lot and twenty acres joining laid out on the right of land
called the parsonage right, in said Litchfield, for and in consideration of the said Judah Champion's settling in the said town as
a gospel minister: We, therefore, as committee aforesaid, for the
consideration aforesaid, do demise, lease, and to farm let, to him
the said Judah Champion, his heirs and assigns, for and during
the full term of nine hundred and ninety-nine years from and
after the 4th day of July, A.D. 1753, the said home lot and twenty
acres joining laid out on the said right, and bounded according
to the survey bill thereof as follows [describing it]. To have
and to hold said demised and leased premises with all the privileges and appurtenances thereof unto him, the said Judah Champion, his heirs and assigns, to his. and their own proper use,
benefit, and behoof, for and during the full term of time aforesaid.
And we, as committee aforesaid, do hereby covenant and promise
to and with the said Judah Champion, his heirs and assigns, to
warrant and defend the said leased premises and appurtenances
to him the said Judah Champion, his heirs and assigns, during
the full term of time aforesaid against all claims and demands.
Witness our hands and seals, the fifteenth day of January, in the
27th year of his Majesty's Reign, George the Second of Great
Britain, &c., King, Annoque Domini 1754."
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Mr. Champion accepted the lease in part payment of his settlement, and held possession of the tract of land under it (continuing in the work of the ministry), from the date thereof to the
time of his death, in October 1810. He devised the land to John
R. Landon, who also went into possession of the same, and by
sundry intermediate conveyances the title which Mr. Champion
and Landon had to the land came to and vested in the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's deed is dated May d 1858, -and from that time
to the present she has been the owner of the land.
All the clergymen who were settled in the town while it continued one ecclesiastical society, and all who have been settled in
the first ecclesiastical society of the town since the same was
divided into different societies, have been settled in the work of
the ministry upon certain stipulated settlements and salaries,
according to contracts made between the town or the first ecclesiastical society on the one hand, and said clergymen on the other,
which salaries and settlements have been fully paid by the town
and society, and received by said clergymen in full compensation
for their services. Neither the town nor society receives, or has
ever received, any annual income or rent from the premises.
In the year 1833, while said Landon was in possession of the
land, the town laid a tax thereon against him, and caused the
same to be collected of him. He immediately after brought an
action against the town to recover back the money so paid. The
case went to the Supreme Court, and is reported in 11 Conn. R.
251. In the present case the plaintiff set up in her pleadings
that judgment and claimed it to be a bar to the present suit.
The record, which was introduced in evidence, showed merely a
declaration in general assump8it, a plea of the general issue, and
the clerk's record of the judgment. There was with the file a
statement of the case by the judge of the Superior Court who
heard it, and a reservation of sundry questions arising on the
facts, the principal one being as to the liability of the land to
taxation, for the advice of the Supreme Court; but it did not
appear otherwise what was decided in the case.
In the several years mentioned in the plaintiff's bill of particulars in the present case the defendants laid a tax on the land
against the plaintiff, and on the 4th day of December 1867,
caused the'sum of $141.81 to be collected of her in payment
thereof, including interest and incidental expenses.
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Upon these facts the court reserved the questions arising in
the case for the advice of this court.

Rubbard and Andrews, for the plaintiff.
0. S. Seymour and G.

. Woodruf, for the defendants.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CARPENTER, J.-The statute of 1859 provides that "whenever
any ecclesiastical society, or any public or charitable institution,
shall have leased or otherwise conveyed any real estate, from
which said society or institution does not receive an annual
income or rent, or where such conveyance is intended to be a perpetual conveyance, such estate shall not be exempt from taxation." The court below has found that neither the town of Litchfield, nor the ecclesiastical society, has ever received any annual
income or rent from the -property here in question. The case
then is brought within the language of the act, and must be
governed by it, unless the statute, so far as it was designed to
a:fect this class of cases, is inoperative, for the reason that it
impairs the obligation of a contract. In Brainardv. Colchester,
81 Conn. 407, it was held by this court that the act was not unconstitutional. We are not disposed to question the correctness
of that decision. The reasons given for it, however, would seem
to indicate that that case was not within the purview of the Act
of 1702, inasmuch as the conveyance in that case defeated the
end sought to be accomplished by the statute. A careful examination of the present case has .led us to the conclusion that it
stands substantially upon the same ground. We are aware that
this question, in its application to this identical land, was decided
in Landon v. Litclhfield, 11 Conn. 251, in accordance with the
plaintiff's claim. But that decision was by a divided court, and
was virtually overruled by the case of Brainard v. Colchfester.
It is not, therefore, binding upon us, but we are at liberty to
decide this case upon principle.
The statute of 1702, so far as it relates to thi present inquiry,
is as follows: "That all such lands, tenements, hereditaments,
and other estates, that either formerly have been, or hereafter
shall be, given and granted, either by the General Assembly
of this colony, or by any town, village, or particular person or
persons, for the maintenance of the ministry of the gospel in any
VOL. XIX.-32
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part of this colony, or schools of learning, or for the relief
of poor people, or for any other public and charitable use, shall for
ever remain and be continued to the use or uses to which such
lands, tenements, hereditaments, or other estates have been or
shall be given and granted, according to the true intent and
meaning of the grantors, and to no other use whatsoever; and
shall also be exempted out of the general lists of estates and free
from the payment of rates."
It is obvious from an inspection of the statute that its chief
object was to secure the estates therein named for the uses and
purposes intended by the grantors, and to prevent their misapplication to other purposes: Brainard v. Colcleeter, supra; ew
Haven v. Sheffield, 80 Conn. 160. The exemption from taxation
was a secondary matter, and clearly contingent upon the former
provision. It has always been the settled policy of the state to
exempt from taxation the property of all religious societies.
Hence it was the obvious intention of the legislature to exempt
it so long as it continued to the uses and purposes for which it was
designed; and it is a fair inference that, whenever such property
should be diverted from such use, the legislature intended that it
should not be so exempt. In this case the lands granted remained
in the hands of the society from 1719 to 1753. In the latter
year the Rev. Mr. Champion was settled over the society, in consideration of a gross sum, £2000, and an annual salary of £800.
The former sum was paid, in part at least, by a lease of the land
in question for 999 years. They, therefore, during the continuance of the lease, parted with their whole interest in the property
for a gross sum, and expended the proceeds in paying an obligation resting upon them; so that neither the land nor its avails
produced an annual income to the society. If the land had been
leased to other parties for cash, and the money had been used to
pay an existing debt, it would hardly be claimned that the transaction was not a diversion. The case does not materially differ
from the one supposed. The society had contracted to pay
£2000, and leased the land in question to raise money for that
purpose. The circumstance that the party to whom the money
was due agreed to take the land in lieu of money, cannot change
the nature or character of the transaction. It was doubtless
supposed that the society had no power to sell, and that a conveyance in fee would work a forfeiture of the estate. Hence a long
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lease was resorted to. Nevertheless, for all purposes involved in
the present inquiry, it was a practical sale, and contrary to the
letter and spirit of the Act of 1702. We think, therefore, notwithstanding the case of Landon v. Litchfield, that the implied
condition contained in the act had not been kept, and consequently that the land ought not to be exempt from taxation.
Such in effect is the decision in Brainardv. Colchester, and we
may safely rest our decision upon the authority of that case.
But we think the constitutionality of the Act of 1859 can be
vindicated upon higher grounds; and as the question is an
important one, in which many towns in the state, are particularly
interested, we feel constrained to go further and express at
length our views and conclusions upon that branch of the case.
We are clearly of the opinion that the Act of 1702"is in no sense
a contract. A public as well as a private statute may form the
basis of a contract. In either case, as in sontracts between
individuals, there must be all the essential elements of a contract;
-a subject-matter-parties capable of contracting-a good and
sufficient consideration-and an actual contract or agreement of
minds. If any one of these requisites is wanting, there is no
more reason for holding the state bound by the transaction than
there would be for holding an individual bound under similar circumstances.
It may be useful, in the first place, to inquire who is the party
with whom the state is supposed to have made a contract? Was
it with the grantors or the society? If the former, then, inasmuch as the immunity did not attach to the land until after the
title passed from them to the society, it is manifest that the plaintiff is not in privity with either of the contracting parties; and
being neither party nor privy to the contract, it is difficult to see
what right she has to derive any advantage from it, or what reason
she has to complain of its violation, if indeed it has been violated.
If such a contract in fact exists, perhaps the heirs or successors
of the grantors might, if a proper case should arise, insist upon
the fulfilment of the contract by the state. But how is such a
case to arise? The grantors parted with all their interest in the
property absolutely. Exemption from taxation will not benefit
them or their successors, and on the other hand taxation will not
injure them. In fact they have not the slightest interest in the
question. Again, regarding them as the party, what evidence is
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there that exemption from the payment of rates had the slightest
influence upon their minds? Their sole motive was to benefit the
grantees. The donation in their hands would be slightly enhanced in value by the operation of the statute; but that was a
mere incident, and there is hardly room for presuming that it had
any perceptible influence. The property they parted with was
the same in value to them whether taxable or otherwise; and we
have no reason to suppose that they would have parted with it
any sooner in the one case than the other. These considerations
show pretty conclusively, in the first place, that there was no contract in fact with the grantors; and in the second place, if the
transaction can in any sense be viewed in the light of a contract,
that the plaintiff is a stranger to it and cannot enforce it.
But if it be claimed that the town or society is the other contracting party, then the plaintiff encounters another difficulty
which is equally fatal to her claim; and that is this, that there is
no consideration to support the contract. It will not be pretended
that the state received any advantage, direct or indirect, which
can be regarded as a sufficient legal consideration. The grantees
parted with nothing of value, they contracted to do nothing, and
there was no agreement, express or implied, on their part, which
can be treated as a consideration for the undertaking of the state.
It may be said that the consideration moved from the grantors.
If it could be made to appear that the exemption was intended
to induce gifts of this kind, and that the conveyance was actually
made in consideration of such exemption, there would be force
in this claim. But if the statute was not intended or designed
for any such purpose, and the grantors parted with their property,
as they certainly may have done, upon other considerations,
independent of that, it would be going too far to hold that the
grantors' deed was a sufficient consideration for the act 6f the
state. One reason is that neither party, so far as we know or
can know, in the day and time of it looked upon the transaction
in that light. The exemption was purely a gratuity, given and
accepted as such. To give it the force and validity of a contract,
beyond the reach of subsequent legislative control, is going farther
than any adjudged case has gone, aside from the cases above
referred to. Before we can give such effect to a statute we ought
to be satisfied, without the aid of presumptions, that the parties
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so intended it. No such intention appears in this case, and the
presumptions are the other way.
But there are other considerations, arising from the motives
which prompted the Act of 1702, and from the language of the
,ct itself, which confirm us in the view we take of this question.
It will be conceded that the design of the legislature was to
benefit, not the grantees of the society, but the society itself. It
would seem to follow, as a necessary consequence, that the
exemption attached to the title of the society, and not to the land.
If therefore the society sell the land, and with the avails create
a permanent fund, from which an annual income is derived, the
fund should be exempt from taxation and not the land. Otherwise the manifest intention of the legislature would be defeated.
It will hardly be claimed that both the fund and the land should
be exempt, as that would be a double exemption, neither intended
nor contemplated by the legislature. But suppose the society,
instead of investing the money in a permanent fund, exhaust
it, as in this case, by the payment of a debt. In such a case the
exemption must attach to the land or nothing. If it does so
attach, and not in the case of a permanent investment, then
We come to this result, that the land would or would not be
exempt, according as the society used its avails for one purpose
or another. It would seem to be trifling to impute to the legislature any such intention. The immunity, if it attached to the
land at all in the hands of the purchaser, cannot be affected by
any subsequent act of the society. It may be suggested in the
case last supposed, that the society received all the benefit the
legislature intended, in the enhanced price of the land, and that
the purchaser, by paying a larger price, has purchased the
exemption, and therefore it is reasonable that he should enjoy it.
A perfect answer to this is, that the legislature did not contemplate a sale for any such purpose, but, on the contrary, the chief
object was to prevent such a disposition of the property. They
intended that land, or other estates so given, should be and
remain a permanent source of revenue. That intention is
defeated in the case supposed, as we have attempted to show, and
therefore the purchaser has no legal or equitable claim to the
exemption.
But again, the statute in terms applies to land previQusly given,
as well as to that given subsequently. It cannot be successfully
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claimed that any contract exists in respect to such donations;
certainly none with the donors. This would seem to be too clear
for argument. However this may be, the point was substantially
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, in Armstrong
v. The Treasurerof Athens County, 16 Peters 281. It appears
in that case that in the year 1804 the legislature of Ohio by
statute exempted from taxation for ever certain lands previously
granted by Congress for the purpose of founding a university in
that state. In 1826 the legislature authorized the board of trustees to sell the land in question upon certain terms, but the act
was silent in respect to the matter of taxation. The court held,
affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio, that the
land was taxable in the hands of the purchasers. If this point
is established it is certainly true that the act in question is not
a contract in respect to a part of the property therein referred to.
In respect to the other part we ought to give the statute the
same interpretation,unless its languageor the nature of the case,
requires a different construction. We see no reason for construing the statute as meaning one thing when applied to one piece
of property and another thing when applied to other property.
There is another feature of this statute which deserves particular attention. It expressly applies to all property which had
been, or which should thereafter be, granted by the General Assembly of this state. Now upon the supposition that the dontract contended for was with the grantors,-and that is the
ground of the decisions of this court in Atwater v. Woodbridge,
6 Conn. 223, and Osborne v. Humphrey, 7 Conn. 335, cases upon
which Landon v. Litchfield rests,-we are driven to the necessity
of holding that the state entered into a contract with itsef, and
pledged its faith to itself, that such property should never be
taxed. If the statute applied only to cases of this description,
no one would contend that it was a contract which tied up the
hands of succeeding legislatures.
On the whole, we think it reasonable, and the only reasonable
course, that the statute, in relation to all the property named in
it, should receive the same construction; that the legislature
intended to place all such property upon the same footing. That
can only be done by rejecting the idea of a contract.
We will close this branch of the case by a reference to the
language of Judge BISSELL, in Parkerv. Redfield, 10 Conn. 495.
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In speaking upon this question, and in relation to the cases of
Atwater v. Woodbridge, and Osborne v. Hfumphrey, he says:" Were this now an open question we might well doubt whether it
be in the power of one legislature by a general law to tie up the
hands of succeeding legislatures; and whether a statute, exempting a particular species of property from taxation, is in the
nature of a contract of perpetual obligation." It is true he
yielded to the authority of those cases; but as that authority is
somewhat shaken by Brainard v. Colchester, we have felt at
liberty to examine the question upon principle, and upon such
examination, being satisfied that those decisions are not founded
in correct principles, we feel constrained to 'disregard their
,authority and to declare the law to be otherwise.
The plaintiff claims that the judgment of the Superior Court
in Landon v. Litehfield estops the defendants from making this
defence. To render a former judgment conclusive on any matter
it is necessary that it should appear that the precise point was in
issue and decided, and that this should appear from the record
itself: Kennedy v. Scovill, 14 Conn. 61, and authorities there
cited. The record in that case consists of the declaration,, the
plea, and the judgment. The declaration was in assumysit, containing the common counts only, the plea was the general issue,
and judgment was finally rendered on a default. It does not
appear from the record that the question now involved was put
in issue, much less that it was tried and determined. The finding
of the Superior Court, which was merely for the purpose of taking the opinion of the Supreme Court upon certain questions of
law therein raised, is not, strictly speaking, a part of the record.
But even if it is, still it does not appear that the question was
tried and decided in the Superior Court. A judgment by default
determines nothing except the plaintiff's right to recover in that
action. Notwithstanding that judgment, it was competent for
the defendants at any time to assert their right to tax this property, and, if that right was disputed, to have the question
directly presented and judicially determined: Standish v. Parker,
2 Pick. 20; Arnold v. Arnold, 17 Pick. 4. But another conclusive answer to this claim is, that the statute of 1859 has materially changed the legal aspect of the question. The most that
can be claimed for the former judgment is, that the land was not
taxable as the law then stood. The question involved in the

LORD v. LITCHFIELD.

present suit is the right to tax the property as the law now
stands.
We advise the Superior Court to render judgment for the
defendants.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The question of the perpetual exemption of specific property by statute, or
legislative contract, from taxation is one
of more essential importance to governmental functions,than, upon firstimpression, would be likely to be apparent to
most legally educated persons even. It
is one of those special privileges, or
exemptions, attached to property, which
could not be made universal or even
general, without destroying the very
existence of government. For the-duties
of government, being, as the very term
implies, of a compulsory character,
and naturally involving the outlay of
large sums of money, could not possibly
be accomplished without the possession
of money and its expenditure. And no
government can possibly hare either
money, or credit, without revenue, or
revenue without taxation, or taxation
without property liable to taxation. It
may not be indispensable, that all public
revenue be raised by direct taxation,
but that must at least be in the power
of government, in order to give it either
credit or independence. Hence it will
be very obvious, that the perpetual
exemption of any property in this way,
from taxation, must be an invidious
privilege, inasmuch as it cannot be so
extended as to become universal, without trenching upon the very vitality of
the government itself.
We may, therefore, very well comprehend, that such exemption, when granted,
should receive a very strict construction ;.
inasmuch as it is not only in derogation of public right, but, in principle,
destructive of it. We are not surprised,
therefore, that those persons, who hold
property under any such exemption,
should attempt to keep up, in the public

conscience, a constant sense of the extreme importance and inviolability of
such special exemptions. But we conjecture, that it might become rather a
thankless, if not a hopeless task, to
inspire any very great and general veneration for any such special and invidious
privilege, provided it were confined to a
few persons, or to some particular class.
That, be sure, would not afford any just
ground to treat it with less respect,
where it existed and was clearly a condition of the title to the property. But
it. may tend to show, that whatever enthusiasm there may exist in the public
mind in favor of the fullest vindication
of such special exemptions, is based
more upon the popular interest in the
question than upon the public sense of
justice, although that might uphold it
within its just limits.
We publish this opinion because it
manifests the manly disposition of a very
able court, to bring this special and invidious exemption within the narrowest
possible, and at the same time just
limits. It is, we think, specially creditable to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, that so large a proportion of its
recent decisions manifest so marked a
disposition to bring special and invidious
privileges, in which only a few persons
at most can participate, within very
narrow limits by the strictest construction consistent with the terms of the
title deed, whether of private contract or
legislative grant, and at the same time,
as far as possible, not allow the processes of judicial administration to be
defeated, or embarrassed by merely
technical refinements; in other words,
manifesting a disposition to maintain the
fair and just merits of causes, in becom-
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lug ingenious, rather how to do, that t held for charitable uses, from taxation,
how not to do the thing, which moral1 attached a condition to the estate in the
justice demands. To this end the couri hands of a lessee for the term of 999
have overruled all their former decisions, years, reserving no annual rent, but
considerably numerous, and of many accepting a gross sum in full of all
years' standing, upon which the exemp-- rents. This decision was based upon
tion of certain property from taxation* the virtual assumption, that the privilege
rested. These cases are referred to in the of exemption from taxation of estates
briefs of counsel and the opinion of the conveyed to charitable uses, while the
court. Landon v. Litchfidd, 11 Conn. statute exempting them from taxation,
251, was decided in regard to the very was in force, attached to the land itself,
same property in question in the present making it thereby more valuable in the
case. We had occasion to examine these hands of the grantee and that it must be
Connecticut cases at an early day, in the transmissible to others with, the same
case of Herrick v. The Town of, Ran- privilege, or else the holder failed
dolph, 13 Vt. Reports 525. And to realize the full benefit of the prialthough we supposed at that time they vilege. The later cases, decided by the
might possibly be maintained, -upon the same court, treat this exemption as
ground that the title to the propertywas one of a very obnoxious character, and
acquired while the exempting statute therefore deserving a very strict conwas in force, and so the exemption was struction: ELLSWORTH, J., in The Town
made to inhere in the very title of the of New Haven v. Shefflield, 30 Conn.
property itself as one of its essential 171. And in Brainard v. Colchester, 31
conditions, we are now satisfied, that Conn. 407, the case of Landon v. Litchthe exempting statute should not be held field is virtually overruled, the court
to attach any such permanent exemption making, as it seems to us, the true disfrom taxation by virtue of the estate or tinction upon this point of exemption
property being acquired during the of property from taxation: 1. That it
operation of a general statute, creating should receive a strict construction and
the exemption. Such a general statute, not he extended further than the fair
exempting certain property from taxa- import of the words require. 2. That
tion should not receive any more ex- when the exemption is based upon
tended operation, because it is expressed the use to which the estate is conto be "for ever," than if it had been veyed, it shall not be construed as atexpressed in general terms. The legis- taching to the land beyond the time of
lature has no power to give its general its appropriation to that use. 3. That
enactments any more extended force than to attach a perpetual exemption of lands
they take by the use of terms, unlimited or real estate from taxation, it must
in point of duration. The same or any form one of the elements of a contract
future legislature may repeal, or modify or grant on the part of the state : as in
them, unless they are of the nature of State of New Jerseg v. Wilson, 7 Cranch
contracts. To have this force the exemp- 164, where land was granted by the
tion must have been granted upon a state to the Indians, upon the express
pecuniary consideration, so as to consti- condition to remain perpetually exempt
tute part of the price of the grant, i. e. from all taxes, and it was held an essenhave made it more valuable.
tial element of the grant and of the
The case of Landon v. Litchfield, 11 title, which the state could not thereafter
Conn. 251, was decided by a divided be permitted to pass any law abridging
court, upon the ground that an early or in any way qualifying or interfering
Colonial Act, 1702, exempting estates with. This principle forms the basis of
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decision in Herrick v. Randolph, stipri,
and is founded upon impregnable principles, which all sound lawyers must
always regard as rendered inviolable by
And
the United States Constitution.
this is the ground upon which the Connecticut court now found themselves;
and which is the most which can be
conceded to any state-statute exempting
property from taxation.
Strictly speaking, we think, an exemption of property from taxation, on
the ground that the state granted the
title and the exemption for a consideration, should be restricted to taxes imposed
upon the property itself, as it is upon
real estate, or personalty sometimes,
set in the list at a valuation. Such an

exemption should never be construed to
extend to income derived from such
estate and for which the owner is taxed
personally. Bnt the abhorrence of the
people against what they call double
taxation has sometimes led to the exemption of all the issues and incidents of
such property, even to the buildings
erected upon land, having such an exemption from taxation.
It has always seemed to us that the
true principles on this subject are contained in the opinions of THomPsoN, J.,
in Weston v. The City of Charleston, 2
Pet. S. C. 449, and that of PAnxru, Ch.
J., in Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 138.
I F. R.

Supreme Court of Calfornia.
VANDALL

ET AL.

V. SOUTH SAN FRANCISCO DOCK COMPANY.

A corporation has no other powers than such as are specifically granted in its
charter, or such as are necessary for the purpose of carrying into effect those
expressly granted.
A corporation formed "to buy, improve, lease, sell, &c., real estate," may
expend its funds for any purpose the direct and proximate tendency of which is
to enhance the market value of its land, though the money is not expended on
the land itself, e. g., it may assess its stockholders -for aid to a railroad which
does not touch its lands, but which by giving increased facilities of access
enhances their value.
The word "improve" used in such connection with real estate means to
enhance its market value.

THIs was an action brought to restrain the defendant from

selling the shares of stock held by the plaintiffs under an assessment made by the trustees of the company.
The defendant is a corporation organized under an amendment
made in 1864 to the general Incorporation Act, stat. 1863, p.
149, and the plaintiffs are stockholders of the corporation.
The corporation was formed "to buy, improve, lease, sell, and
otherwise dispose of real estate" in and near South San Francisco ; "also, to build water front protection, slips, docks, piers,
wharves, warehouses, and otherwise improve such property as

may be obtained by the company."

The company purchased
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and owned a tract of land at or in the vicinity of South San
Francisco; and another corporation known as the Potrero and
Bay View Railroad Company had constructed, or was engaged
in constructing a railroad from the city of San Francisco proper
to the vicinity of the defendant's property; and an agreement
was entered into between the defendant and the railroad company, whereby the latter bound itself within a stipulated period.
to increase the width of its road and the frequency of the trips
of its cars over it, and to reduce the price of passage over it
about fifty per cent., and to maintain these conditions for a period
of ten years. The'defendant, on its part, agree*d to pay to the
railroad company, as a consideration for these concessions, the
sum of $20,000, and the assessments in question were levied by
the trustees on the stock of the company for the purpose of raising a fund sufficient to pay this demand. The railroad did not
terminate upon or touch any portion of the property of the
defendant, but it was established on the trial, and appears to
have been admitted by the plaintiffs, that the increased facilities
of travel over the railroad, resulting from the contract between
lie two companies, had already greatly enhanced the market
value of the defendant's property, and were likely to increase it
more largely in the future.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CROCKETT, 3.-Plaintiffs insist that, under its act of incorporation, the defendant has no power to expend the money of the
company-for the purpose stated, and that the assessment is, therefore, void. On the other hand, the defendant claims that the
chief object of the corporation was to buy and sell real estate on
speculation; and that with a view to that end it is expressly
authorized to "improve" its real estate, so as to enhance its
value; and that upon a fair and reasonable construction of the
word "improve," as used in the certificate of incorporation, it
must be held to include every act the direct and immediate tendency of which is materially to benefit or enhance the value of
the property. The plaintiffs resist this construction, and maintain that the word "improve" can include nothing but acts performed on the land itself, such as the erection of buildings, the
construction of roads across it, or other acts of a like. nature
performed on the land.
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The only difficulty which arises in the solution of this question
results from the peculiar nature of the corporation, and the very
novel purposes for which it was formed. It is well settled that a
railroad corporation, formed for the purpose of constructing,
maintaining and operating a railway, cannot engage in the business of running a line of steamers in connection with the railway,
however much such an enterprise may increase the business of
the road and add to its profits: Colman v. JEastern Counties
Railway Co., 10 Bear. 1; McCarty v. Roots, 21 How. 482; nor
engage in the banking business, in order to raise a fund with
which to construct or operate its road: Waldo v. Chicago Railroad Co., 14 Wis. 580. It may be stated as a general proposition, "that a corporation has no other powers than such as are
specifically granted, or such as are necessary for the purpose of
carrying into effect the powers expressly granted :" Angell &
Ames on Corp. sect. 111.
As if to preclude all doubt on this point, the second section of
our General Corporation Act has, in express terms, re-enacted
this provision of the common law.
It cannot be doubted, therefore, that a corporation in this state
may not only exercise the powers specifically enumerated in its
certificate of incorporation, if they be such as are authorized
by law, but also such other powers "as shall be necessary to the
exercise of the powers so enumerated and given." It results that
in determining whether a given act is within the power of the corporation, we must consider, first, whether it falls within the powers
expressly enumerated in the certificate; or, second, whether it is
necessary to the exercise of one of the enumerated powers. The
powers enumerated in this certificate are to buy, improve, lease,
sell, or otherwise dispose of real estate; and to build water-front
protection, slips, docks, piers, wharves, warehouses, and otherwise
improve such property as may be obtained by the company.
On behalf of the plaintiffs it is insisted that the contract for
additional railroad facilities, however much they may enhance the
value of the property, is not within any of the enumerated
powers, nor necessary to the exercise of any of them.
But in examining this question, we must necessarily consider
the general purposes for which the corporation was formed; and
must give such reasonable construction to the terms employed, as
will tend to promote rather than to defeat or obstruct the ends
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for which the corporation was organized. In authorizing a corporation to be formed for the purpose of buying, selling, leasing,
and improving real estate, the statute conferred upon the corporators all such implied or incidental powers as shall be necessary
to the exercise of those expressly granted. It is evident the corporation might purchase real estate and improve it, for the sole
purpose of selling it at a higher price or leasing it at an enhanced
rent. To speculate in the purchase and sale of real estate may
be the sole object of such a corporation; and such appears to have
been the purpose of this corporation. In furtherance of this
end and with a view to enhance its value, it is expressly authorized
to improve the property so purchased; and the plaintiffs insist
that by this term is meant only erections upon or something performed on the land itself, to ameliorate its condition; such as the
erection of buildings, or fences, or necessary grading, or ditching
to improve the drainage. But in view of the evident purpose
and design for which the corporation was organized, I think this
is too narrow a construction of the word "improve," as used in
the certificate. It may be that its ordinary meaning, as usually
employed, is limited as claimed by the plaintiffs. But it also
has a larger and wider signification; and amongst other definitions, Worcester defines the word "improve" to mean, "to make
good use of; to employ advantageously; to increase, augment, or
enhance, as to that which is evil ;" whilst Webster defines it, "to
make better; to advance in value; to use or employ to good purpose; to make productive; to turn to profitable account; to use
for advantage." In view of the fact that these corporations are
or may be formed for the sole purpose of purchasing real estate,
enhancing its value and then selling it for an increased price, I
think the term "improve," as here used, was employed in its
more liberal sense, and includes the performance of any act,
whether on or off the land, the direct and proximate tendency
of which is to enhance its value in the market.
But I am not to be understood as holding that the corporation
may do any act which, in some remote degree, may tend ultimately to enhance the value of-the property. It could not, for example, establish a line of steamers to Japan, or an Emigration Aid
Society, on the plea that an increase to the trade or population
of the state would promote the general prosperity, and thereby
enhance the value of the corporate property. But, as already
stated, the act must be one the direct and proximate tendency of
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which is to benefit the property or enhance its value. If the
property, for example, should be surrounded by an impenetrable
morass, or rugged hills, so that it is inaccessible and valueless in
its present condition, I do not doubt that the corporation might
drain or bridge over the morass, or construct a road across the
hills, so as to render the property accessible and thereby enhance
its value. This would justly be held to "improve" the property
without straining, in the least degree, the meaning of the term,
as here employed. If the opposite construction were to prevail,
a work imperatively required to render the property available for
the purposes for which it was acquired could not be performed.
If the land was threatened with inundation, and was about to be
washed away by a freshet, nothing could be done to avert the
threatened calamity; or if its value was destroyed by a contiguous nuisance, no money could be expended to abate the nuisance.
I am satisfied so narrow a construction of the powers granted
to this class of corporations would, in many cases, practically defeat the purposes for which they were organized. I am aware
that in some cases it may be difficult to define accurately the
point at which the benefit to be derived from a proposed work
would cease to be direct and proximate, and would become so remote as not to fall within the rule. But it is impossible to lay
down an inflexible rule to govern such cases, and each case must
be determined on its own circumstances.
I am satisfied that this case comes fully within the rule, and
that the benefit to the property of the company, resulting from
the contract with the railroad company, is direct and proximate
and not remote.
I may remark in conclusion, that whatever difficulties surround
this question, result from the peculiar nature of this class of
corporations, organized for the novel purpose of speculating in
real estate; and though it may be a very questionable policy,
which permits corporations to be formed for such a purpose, that is
a consideration to be addressed to the legislature and not to
the court. So long as such corporations are authorized by law,
it is the duty of the courts to give suah effect to them as the statute contemplates.
Judgment reversed, and the cause remanded, with an order to
the District Court to dissolve the injunction and dismiss the action.
This case is of the same class with
the numerous others of late, presenting

the inquiry as to the right of corporations, whether municipal or private, to
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form connections with railway cornpanies, bk' way of association or contract. Although it must be admitted
some doubt will naturally arise in
regard to the right of a private corporation, like the one in question, to build
a railway or take stock in one, or in
any other mode subsidize it, for the purpose of enhancing the value or the
ready sale of its lands, under the
shield of the express authority given to
"improve" them, it cannot, we think,
be fairly argued, that,, upon principle,
the thing is of the same questionable
character, as for municipalities to do the
same. It is no part of the business of
a municipality to facilitate access to and
escape from its own borders ; but only
in that regard to afford comfortable
means of travel and traffic within its
limits. Nor can it fairly be said that it
comes within any well defined or clearly
recognised function of the municipal
governments of the state, to do auything
with the direct and leading purpose of
increasing the value of property, real or
personal ; or indeed to advance trade
and business in general, either within
or without its territorial limits, as it owns
no such property and can embark in no
trade. Hence the incongruity, in allowing the municipalities, whose functions
are simple and strictly defined and
restricted to the narrowest limits, to mix
themselves up in anypossible form with
private corporations, having rights and
duties of an entirely separate and distinct character, is altogether more obvious that can be claimed in regard to
a corporation like the present, whose
leading object and purpose is to advance
the value and ready sale of its own
lands. There seems to be no good
ground to question the right of such a
corporation to facilitate access to and
egress from such lands, in all legitimate

modes. And we should not be inclined
to question that this might be done by
such a corporation by means of improved
railway facilities, unless the terms in
which its powers are defined, exclude
that particular mode or else enumerate
them in such a way, as to indicate very
obviously that this particular one could
not be considered as fairly embraced.
And there is nothing in the enumeration
here, which would seem fairly to exclude expending money to increase railway facilities. The mere "buying and
selling" of real estate in large quantities, in the new states, might fairly
enough embrace this. And especially
will this construction appear reasonable
and natural, if we consider the express
provisions in the charter for "improving" the same in connection with its
purchase and sale, and as one of the
natural and direct modes of producing
an enhanced price. And this becomes
a more obvious and allowable view,
when we consider that many analogous
modes of improvement are specially
enumerated, such as building "waterfront protection, slips, docks, piers,
wharves, warehouses," &c., &c., when
especially we consider that increased
railway facilities are among -the indispensable things to render the enumerated facilities productive in the increase
of traffic by land and commerce upon
the ocean. The word "improve" as
applied to real estate, for use and enjoyment, no doubt, commonly extends only
to erections and meliorations upon the
land itself. But when the land is to
be brought into the market and improved
for the purpose of sale and advancement in price, it will naturally require a
much more extended application, and
we cannot fairly say that we think the
view the court take objectionable.
1. F. R.
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United States Circuit Court, IDiotricts of Missouri.
WELCH v. STE. GENEVIEVE.
A municipal corporation created by legislative act is not dissolved by its failure
to elect officers.
In this country, officers do not, in the sense of the English books, constitute an
integral part of the corporation, but they are the mere agents or servants of the
corporate body.
Municipal corporations cannot be dissolved by the courts for non-user or misuser of their powers or franchises.
Where a judgment existed against a municipal corporation, having no property
subject to sale, and whose duty it was to levy and collect a special tax to pay the
judgment, and where the corporation was without officers, and would not, though
having the power, supply itself with officers, the court appointed its marshal to
assess, levy, and collect the requisite tax ; but suspended the order so as to allow
the corporation to reorganize and itself to collect the tax.
The Ousting Ordinance passed by the Constitutional Convention of Missouri
and the General Town Incorporation Act of that state, construed and applied.

MOTION to appoint a commissioner to levy and collect taxes to
pay the plaintiff's judgment.
On September 9th 1865, the plaintiff filed in this court his
declaration on certain negotiable bonds issued by the city of Ste.
Genevieve, and the summons was served on the 11th of the same
month on "Francis C. Rozier, President of the Board of Aldermen and acting Mayor" of the said city. The record in that
case recites an appearance by counsel for the city and an agreement that the defendant will enter its appearance at the next
term. At the October Term, 1866, judgment by default was
rendered against the defendant for $5605.
In May 1870, the plaintiff filed his petition in this court for a
mandamu8, stating therein.the recovery of the above-mentioned
judgment; that execution has been issued and and returned nulla
bona; that the debt remains unpaid; that no tax to pay the same
has ever been levied; that Francis C. Rozier was the last elected
mayor and certain other persons named were the last aldermen
of the city; that they duly qualified when elected, and served and
axe still in law officers of the corporation; that no election has
been held, and that the failure to elect is for the purpose of preventing the petitioner and others from collecting their bonds;
that there is no way in which the petitioner can collect but by the
relief prayed for, which is for a writ of mandamus to compel
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Rozier and the aldermen named to levy a tax upon the inhabitants and property of the city sufficient to pay the judgment.
An alternative writ was issued as asked, to which, at the October Term 1870, Rozier and the other persons named made return
as individuals and not as mayor and aldermen of the city. They
set out in substance in this return, that they were the mayor and
aldermen of the city on the 4th day of July 1865; that on
that day the new State Constitution was put into force, containing
an ordinance (popularly known as the "1Ousting Ordinance"), by
which it was provided that within sixty days thereafter every
person holding any office of honor or profit under the state, and
in any municipal corporation,should take and subscribe the oath

of loyalty therein preseribed, failing to take which oath within
sixty days, said office, it was declared, should ipso facto become
vacant, and the vacancy should be filled according to the law
governing the case; and it was made penal to hold or exercise
any of said offices without having taken and subscribed the oath.
The said persons returned that they failed to take the oath,
whereby their offices became vacant on the 4th day of September
1865 (five days before plaintiff's original suit was brought), and
they have not since acted. It was also stated in the return, that
in August 1865, a pretended election was held, and city officers
elected who had taken the oath of loyalty, but that these persons
refused to qualify, and n~ver did qualify or act; no record of
this election could be found.
The return referred to the act of the legislature of Missouri,
approved February 19th 1866 (Stats. 1865, p. 911), which recites
that "1on account of past troubles of the country, certain incorporated towns and cities in this state have failed to hold their
regular elections for offices now vacant and elective under their
respective charters," and enacts "that any justice of the peace
residing within the limits of any such incorporated town or city
is required on the petition of twenty-five qualified voters of such
town or city, to order at once a special election to fill all vacancies in offices elective under their respective charters," &c.
The return stated that no election whatever had been held
under the last-mentioned act, and that the books and papers of
the corporation are in the office of the clerk of the court.
The return then set up that, on the 4th of. June 1867, the
County Court of Ste. Genevieve county, acting under the genVOL. XIX.-33
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eral laws of the state concerning municipal corporations, declared
the "town of Ste. Genevieve" incorporated by the name of " The
Inhabitants of Town of Ste. Genevieve," and a certified copy of
the proceedings of the county court in this regard were filed with
the return; and the respondents denied that they were officers of
the city, and claimed that by the constitutional ordinance aforesaid they were absolutely forbidden to act as such officers, and
they asked to be dismissed.
On this return the respondents were discharged, and Welch,
the judgment-creditor, filed his petition stating the above facts,
and stating that there are not now, nor have there been for some
years past, any officers of any kind in said corporation; that said
corporation exists; that it has no property on which to levy; that
his judgment is yet unpaid, and asking this court to appoint the
marshal or some competent person to assess, levy and collect upon
the taxable property within the corporation a tax sufficient to
pay the judgment.
Glover and Shepley, for the plaintiff.
Thomas C. Beynolds, contra (Amicus Curie).
DILLON, Circuit J.-This application presents novel and
interesting questions, some of which are of first impression.
These will be noticed, however, only s; far as may be necessary
to reach a conclusion. The city corporation not now appearing
by counsel, and the record of the judgment upon the bonds
against the city reciting an appearance by it and service of the
summons having been made upon the last chief officer of the city,
the validity of the judgment must, in this proceeding, be assumed:
1 Rev. St., 1855, sect. 2, art. 2; Iuscatine Turnverein v.
Punck, 18 iowa 469.
The city of Ste. Genevieve was specially incorporated in 1849
by a public act of the legislature of the state : Laws 1849, 298.
Its charter has been several times amended, and it was in 1851
expressly authorized to issue the bonds to the plank-road company
on which the plaintiff's judgment was rendered (Act Feb. 7th
1851), and it was subsequently authorized to levy and collect
annually a special tax, to pay interest on such bonds: Act Feb.
23d 1853.
The constitution of the corporation is after the usual model
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of municipal corporations having a special charter; the inhabitants are the corporators, the mayor is the chief executive officer,
and the aldermen constitute the governing body.
It is suggested that the corporation thus created has been dissolved because .of Its failure to elect municipal officers, and the
disuse of its corporate functions since September 4th 1865, when
all of the municipal offices became absolutely vacant by force of
the ousting ordinance passed by the Constitutional Convention.
To this proposition I cannot give my assent. I deny that a corporation created by the legislature for the purpose of local municipal government can, without a provision to that effect, be dissolved by the mere failure to elect officers. The -corporation is
created by the charter. The officers do not constitute the corporation, nor does the council even constitute a corporation. The
inhabitants of the designated locality are the corporators. The
officers are the mere servants or agents of the corporation. Municipal corporations are created for public purposes, being auxiliaries of the state to assist in local administration.
The effect at common law of the dissolution of a corporation
was that debts due by and to it were discharged and its property
reverted to the grantors. Formerly corporations of all kinds in
England, both private and municipal, were usually created by
royal charter, and the courts in that country have held or assumed that the loss of an integral part would dissolve a municipal corporation, or at least suspend its existence, and that its
charter might, for a misuse of its franchises, be declared forfeited
by judicial sentence in quo wanranto, as in the famous case against
the city of London in the time of Charles II. Upon a critical examination of the decisions in England, I doubt whether it is settled
law even in that country, that a municipal corporation can be totally dissolved in either of these ways; but if so, the doctrine has
no application to our municipal corporations, which are brought
into existence for public purposes by legislative act, and which
do not, in the sense of the English books, consist of integral,
parts.
For non-use or misuse courts may judicially declare forfeited
the charters of private, but not public corporations.
The charter or constituent act of the corporation of Ste. Genevieve not being limited in duration, and not having been repealed
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by the legislature, is still in force and the artificial body which
it created still exists.
Under the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits a
state from passing any act which impairs the obligation of contracts, it may be doubted whether it would be possible even for
the legislature of the state, notwithstanding its general supremacy over the public corporations, to dissolve a corporation so as to
defeat the rights of its creditors : Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 4
Wall. 537 ; Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 583.
But if the state has the power it has not attempted to exercise
it; on the contrary the Act of February 19th 1866, recognises in
the clearest terms the corporations as still existing, notwithstanding their failure to hold their elections for offices made vacant by
the ousting ordinance, and provides a method by which elections
may be held and corporate officers supplied. There is much discussion in the adjudged cases, and some contrariety of opinion
with respect to the right of officers to hold over in the absence of
express provision beyond their terms and until their successors
are elected and qualified. But that question is not in this case,
because whatever might otherwise be the legal right of the officers of the city to hold over, they cannot do so if they fail to take
the oath required by the ousting ordinance.
The officers of the city having failed to take the prescribed
oath, their official existence was absolutely at an end on the 4th
day of September 1865, and at that time the corporation had no
legal officers. The corporation offices became vacant, and not
having been filled are still vacant. And we have the 'anomaly
presented of a public corporation without any officers de jure or
even de facto to execute its powers or fulfil its duties.
It is not suggested that the old corporation, if not dissolved in
the manner before considered, was nevertheless dissolved or superseded by the organization in 1867, of the town corporationby
the County Court under the general laws of the state: Rev.
Stat. 1865, chap. 41, p. 240.
If it was thus superseded the inquiry would arise whether the
town corporation was anything more than the authorized legal
successor of the old corporation, and bound to discharge its obligations.
But on examining the above-mentioned statute, under which
the supposed new incorporation was attempted and on which it
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rests for all the legal virtue it possesses, we find that it only authorizes, in the mode therein prescribed, the incorporation of
towns and cities not already incorporated. It does not empower
a town or city incoxporated by special charter, and which cannot
therefore destroy its corporate life at its own pleasure, to abandon
its charter without the consent of the legislature which gave it,
thereby leaving the locality without municipal government or'
rule.
Legislative sanction is, in this country, indispensably necessary
to the existence of every corporation; and as this new town
organization is without legislative authority, it is .wholly without
validity, and its officers have no right in law to exercise powers
under the general corporation act; much less have they the right
to exercise the functions of officers under the special charter.
The city corporation being that which was established by the
legislature under the charter, and that corporation remaining in
existence, although it is without officersi it is clear that no validity
can attach to an unauthorized organization under the general
law. Offices must be de jure, but officers may be such de facto.
To say that an officer is one de facto, when the office itself is not
created or authorized by the legislature, is a political solecism,
having no foundation in reason nor support in law: Decorah v.
Bullis, 25 Iowa 12, 18; Hildreth's Heirs v. McIntire'8 Devisees,
1 J. J. Marsh. 206; The People v. White, 24 Wend. 520, 540.
If the gentlemen who are claiming under the new organization
to be the officers of the town had been elected under the charter,
though irregularly, and were exercising and claiming to exercise
the powers given by the charter, which is still the organic act of
the municipality, they would be, in the true sense of the term,
officers de facto, and their acts as respects the public would be
valid, and this court might, notwithstanding the irregularities in
their election, issue its mandamus to them to levy and collect the
tax necessary to satisfy the plaintiff's judgment.
But they were not elected under the charter, nor do they claim
or assume to be officers of the city; and hence they could not lawfully levy or collect the tax; and there is no duty resting upon
them in this respect, which this court could compel them to execute by its writ of mandamus.
The corporation under the special charter and its amendments
is the legal and only corporate body; the new organization is a
bold usurpation of the franchises of the state, and its acts, unless
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ratified by the legislature, are simply void: Decorah v. .Bulli,
25 Iowa 12.
Thus we perceive the suggestion that the new organization destroyed or superseded the old corporation to be unfounded. Not
only so, but the foregoing observatiouis answer the further suggestion that the creditor should cause a writ of mandamus to be
issued and directed to the officers who are acting under the new
town organization.
The way is thus cleared to the immediate question which the
court is called upon to decide, viz.: Whether it will appoint its
marshal or some other proper person to assess and collect from
the property of the municipality a tax suicient to pay the plaintiff's debt.
For that debt he has the judgment of this court. Execution
has been returned nulla bona. If the corporation had officers a
mandamus to require them to levy and collect the tax would be a
remedy not only. proper in itself, but one to which the judgment
plaintiff is entitled as of right. This is settled law in this court,
and it is not necessary to cite cases upon the subject decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States. The corporation, however, has no officers, and we fear it is but too plain that the reason why the inhabitants do not elect officers under the Act of February 19th 1866, is that they cherish the delusion that they can
defeat the rights of creditors, and by taking on a new organization
escape old liabilities. Such notions of justice or corporate morality,
if entertained, receive no countenance in the legislation or judicial
decisions in Missouri or elsewhere: Lindell v. Burton, 6 Mo.
861; Rev. St. 1865, p. 244; Butz v. 3fuseatine, 8 Wall. 575,
581-3-4; Bank v. Patton, 1 Rob. (La.) 499; Van Hoffman v.
Quincy, 4 Wall. 537.
This court must protect and enforce the rights of its constitutional suitors. The sending of its marshal into an indebted municipality, armed with authority to levy and collect a tax, is the
exercise of a delicate and extraordinary power, to be avoided
whenever possible; but which it will use whenever judgments it
renders cannot otherwise be enforced: Riggs v. Johnson County,
6 Wall. 166, 198 ; Lansnq v. Treasurer,t., 9 Am. Law Reg. N.
S. 415.
Were there any municipal officers in esse, the court certainly
would not, in the first instance appoint its marshal, but would
issue its command to them.
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Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, which is without a precedent, there seems to be no remedy to the plaintiff but
to make the order he asks.
Anxious, however, to avoid, if it may be, the carrying of this
order into effect, and allow the corporation time to elect officers
and itself to levy and collect the tax, the execution of the order
will be suspended for the space of three months, and the right
reserved to suspend it longer if a showing be made to the court,
or either of its judges, that an election of municipal officers, as
provided by the law and charter, has been duly held, and that
the proper body hias levied and is proceeding, according to law,
to collect the taxes necessary to satisfy the plaintiff's judgment.
Ordered accordingly.
TREAT and KREKEL, JJ., concurred.

United State8 Oireuit Court, Southern District of Georgia.
IREDELL P. DAVIS v. ELIZABETH HATCHER, EXECUTRIX OF
SAMUEL J. HATCHER.
The statutes of limitations of the state of Georgia passed during the war,
however defective they may have been in point of original authority, were ratified
by the Constitution of 1868,1 and are valid.
A surety is discharged where the creditor after notice and request, has been
guilty of a delay which amounts to gross negligence, and by his negligence the
surety has lost his security or indemnity. But the omission of the creditor to
sue a principal residing in another state could not, under any circumstances, as
between him and the surety, make him chargeable with gross negligence.

THiS was an action of assumysit commenced on the 31st of
December 1869, on a promissory note, dated at Columbus, Ga.,
December 30th 1858, given by Reuben Allison as principal and
Samuel J. Hatcher as surety, to P. J. Phillips, executor of H. H.
Lowe, or bearer, for the sum* of $1125, payable on the 1st of
I The Constitution of 1868 is the present Constitution of Georgia, ordained
and adopted by the Georgia Convention assembled in pursuance of the leconstruction Acts of Congress; ratified by the people of Georgia at an election held
in April 1868, under order from A1,jor-General Meade. Accepted by the Congress of the United States on the 25th June 1868, with certain conditions : Public
Laws of United States 1867-8, pp. 73, 74; and assented to by the General
Assembly of Georgia on the 21st day of July 1868.-ED. Ax. LAw REG.
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January 1860, at the agency of the Bank of Savannah, in Columbus, with interest from date if not punctually paid. The
surety endorsed a waiver of protest at the maturity of the note.
There was *averdict for plaintiff and motion for new trial.
BRADLEY, Circuit J.-The action was brought by Davis, as
bearer, against the defendant as executrix of the surety. It is
apparent that it was not brought for nearly ten years after the
note became due, and the statute of limitations for such demands
in Georgia is six years. The principal question in the case is,
whether the laws and ordinances passed since the note became
due have prevented the operation of the statute upon the cause
of action arising thereon. The case was tried in December last,
and the judge presiding ruled that the statute of limitations had
been suspended so as to save the action. By an act of the legislature of Georgia passed in December 1860, the several statutes
of limitation were suspended for one year. The Ordinance of
Secession was passed January 19th 1861, and a new constitution
was adopted in March and ratified in July following. By an act
passed December 14th 1861, the statiftes of limitation then in
force were suspended during, the then existing war, and where the
statute had commenced to run, it was suspended until peace should
be declared. After the war the convention of the pebple of
Georgia, assembled by the provisional governor, in pursuance of
President Johnson's proclamation of June 17th 1865, met at
Milledgeville, and on the 81st day of October 1865, passed an
ordinance which, amongst other things, ordained that the statutes
of limitation in all cases, civil and criminal, should be suspended
from the 19th of January 1861, until civil government should be
fully restored, or the legislature should otherwise direct. Besides
a constitution of the state, other ordinances were passed by said
convention in the form of laws, which were observed as such for
several years. By the third section of article eleven of the Constitution of 1868, adopted by the convention assembled under the
reconstruction acts of Congress, it was declared, amongst other
things, "that all acts passed by any legislative body, sitting in
this state as such, since the 19th day of January 1861, except
such as were inconsistent with the Constitution of the United
States, or this constitution, or as may have been passed in aid of
the late rebellion," &e., should be of force in this state, but that
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the General Assembly might alter or repeal the same, if not
otherwise prohibited by the constitution. By the fifth section of
the same article it was declared that all rights, privileges, and
immunities which might have vested in or accrued fo any person
or persons under any act of any legislative body, sitting as such,
or any decree, judgment, or order of any court sitting in this
state under the laws then of force and operation therein and
recognised by the people as a court of competent jurisdiction since
thb 19th of January 1861, should be held inviolate, unless attacked for fraud or otherwise declared invalid by or according to
this constitution. *The General Assembly established under this
constitution, by an act passed March 16th 1869, declared that
all acts of the legislature of this state, and all ordinances of the
conventions of 1865 and 1868, which have the force and effect
of law, which are retroactive in their character relative to the
statutes of limitation, should be held to be null and void, in all
cases in which the statute had fully run, before the passage of
said retroactive legislation. This review of the legislation which
has taken place, leads to the following conclusions: 1st. That
the suspensory laws of 1861 and 1865, however defective they
may have been in point of original authority, were ratified by
the Constitution of 1868. 2d. That the Act of 1869 does not
control or modify their operation, except as to cases in which the
statute had fully run, before their passage "respectively."
These
points being established, the case does not present the slightest
difficulty.
The ordinary statute in this case did not commence to run till
January 4th 1860, and-would not have fully run till January 3d
1866. It was suspended therefore, both by the Act of 1861, during the whole continuance of the war, and by the ordinance of
1865, from the 19th of January 1861, until civil government
should be fully restored. Deduct this period of suspension from
the time that elapsed before the commencement of this suit, and
it will be found to have commenced within six years from the maturity of the note. I have been referred to the case of Calhoun
v. Kellogg, 41 Ga. 231, to show that the Supreme Court of this
state has held that the ordinance of 1865 was not in legal operation until the Constitution of 1868 made it so. I do not so understand the case. The court did decide, however, that if the statute had fully run before the passage of the ordinance of 1865,
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though not until after the Act of 1861, the cause of action was
not revived. If that decison should be regarded as decisive of
the law of Georgia, still it does not affect this case. But with
the highest respect for the court by which it was made, it seems
to me that the dissenting views of Justice WARNER, are founded
on the better reason, and that they are sustained by thie previous
decision of the same court in Brian v. Banks, 38 Ga. 300. That
however, is a question of local law which it does not become
necessary to decide.
Another point was made on the trial which it becomes necessary for me to notice. It arises under the statute of this state,
passed in 1826, and re-enacted in 1831, by which the security or
endorser of any promissory note or other instrument, after the
same has become due, may require the holder to proceed to collect the same, and if he does not proceed to do so within three
months after such notice or requisition, the endorser or surety
shall become no longer liable. Such a notice was given in this
case in December 1861, or January 1862, by the executrix to
the payee of the note, who then held the same. But it is admitted that the principal resided and still resides in Alabama. By
repeated decisions of the courts of this state, it has been held, that
if the principal does not reside in this state, the holder of the note
is not bound by the law. He cannot be compelled to go out of
the state to sue the principal. Those decisions are binding on
this court. It was also contended on the trial, and made a
point here, that on general principles of law, if the surety require the creditor to collect the money of the principal, and he
neglects doing so when he can, and the principal afterwards
becomes insolvent, the surety will be discharged. I do not so
understand the law. The contract between the parties is this: "If
A. does not pay the debt, I, the surety, will pay it." To make it
read, "if A. does not pay the debt, I will pay it, if you prosecute
A. when I request it," is to introduce a new term into the contract.
Who is guilty of laches, the creditor or the surety after the principal fails to pay the debt at maturity ? Is it not the duty of
the surety by his contract to pay it, and not subject the creditor
to the necessity of bringing a suit? There may be equitable
considerations which would make it extremely hard and unjust
for the creditor to refuse to prosecute the principal. But when
they arise, they belong strictly to equity, and a court of equity is
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the proper tribunal to consider them. Mr. Parsons, in his work
on Contracts, after reviewing some of the cases, says: "A surety
is discharged where the creditor, after notice and request, has
been guilty of a delay which amounts to gross negligence, and by
his negligence the surety has lost his security or indemnity." (Vol.
2, p. 25, 5th Ed.) How can a surety be said to have lost his
scurity by the negligence of the creditor to sue, when by paying
the debt himself, as was his duty to do, he could at any moment
have instituted suit against the principal? In this case the omission of the creditor to sue a principal residing in another state
could not, under any circumstances, as between him and the
surety, make him chargeable with gross negligence. The motion
for a new trial is refused.

United States Ikistriet Court, We8tern District of Wisconsin.
MATTER OF W. S. STEVENS, BANKRUPT.'
It is the duty of a court of bankruptcy to see that the property to which a bankrupt is entitled is secured to him, as much as to see that he surrenders the balance
to his creditors.
Personal property exempt by the laws of the state where the bankrupt resides
and where the petition is 'filed, will be protected wherever it may be actually
situated.
Personal property of a debtor residing in Wisconsin was attached in Illinois.
Pending the attachment the debtor filed a petition in bankruptcy in Wisconsin.
The property was exempt by the laws of Wisconsin. UHed:
1. That the property was exempt under the Bankrupt Act and the attachment
dissolved.
2. The Bankruptcy Court will vot consider whether the property was exempt
under the laws of Illinois.
3. The officer in possession of the property under the attachment writ cannot
retain the property until his fees are paid. His only remedy is by application to
the court to be paid out of funds in the hands of the assignee.

THIS was a case of voluntary bankruptcy. The petition was
filed September 30th 1870, and at the request of the bankrupt,
a provisional assignee was appointed of his estate. A portion of
the property at the time (a span of horses, wagon and harness)
I We are indebted to Josiah H. Bissell, official reporter, for the following
opinion. Mr. Bissell's Reports (the first volume of which is now in press) comprise the decisions in the Circuit and District Courts within the 7th Judicial
Circuit, since 6 McLean (1855) down to the present time.
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was in the posession of a constable, in Winnebago county, Illinois,
under and by virtue of attachments issued against the bankrupt,
by a justice of the peace of the state of Illinois, in favor 'of
divers creditors of the bankrupt residing in Wisconsin. The property thus held was claimed by the bankrupt, in his petition, as
exempt under the Bankrupt Act. The attaching creditors now
moved the court to modify the order appointing the provisional
assignee, so as to exempt from the operation thereof the property
attached and held in the state of Illinois.
. A. Parsons,for bankrupt.

S. J. Todd, for creditors.
HOPKINS, D. J.-The ground of this motion is that by the laws
of Illinois, the property was not exempt, and that by the attachments the creditors acquired a valid lien upon it as against the
bankrupt; and further that as under the Bankrupt Act it would
be exempt and would not pass to the assignee, the bankrupt was
the only party who could contest the right to the property under
the attachment; that the assignee has no right to take possession
of it under the act, nor had the other creditors any right or interest in the question, for if released from the attachment it
would be exempt under the Bankrupt Act, and if held, it would
be taking property they could not in any way reach. This is an
ingenious view of the question, but I think untenable. I think it is
as much the duty of the court to protect tle rights of the bankrupt as the creditors. If by the act he is entitled to certain exempt property, it is the duty of the court to see that he has it.
When a bankrupt surrenders all his property to his creditors,
except certain portions which the act exempts for his own use
and the use and convenience of his family, it is the duty of the
court to see that the portion he is entitled to is secured to him,
as much as it is to see that the portion he is required to surrender to his creditors is surrendered to them.
This court proceeds under the bankrupt law only, and administers that, and has original jurisdiction as to all matters and
things to be done under and by virtue of the bankruptcy. One
of the things to be done under the act, is to assign and set off
to the bankrupt, the exemptions mentioned in the 14th section.
The bankrupt claims under that section this property that is
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attached, and it is the duty of the court, if it is exempt by that
act, to assign it to him as exempt property. No one will deny
that it is exempt by the laws of this state, the domicil of the
bankrupt, and being so it is. unquestionably exempt by the 14th
section of the Bankrupt Act.
Now can this court look into the laws of Illinois, to see whether
it is exempt there or not ? What has this court to do with the
exemption laws of Illinois ? I cannot see that it has anything.
It must administer the Bankrupt Act and settle and determine
the rights of the bankrupt and his creditors, under that act alone.
If under that act, a creditor has a valid lien, or one that it recognises, then it will be sustained; and if that act does not recognize
the lien then it cannot be sustained. It may be true that but for the
bankruptcy proceedings, the attaching creditors could have held
this property, and the same may be said of all attachments against
bankrupts' estates that are dissolved by proceedings in bankruptcy.
After the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy all proceedings by the creditors in the state courts against the bankrupt
are forbidden, and all attachments issued within four months are,
oy the express terms of the act, declared to be dissolved without
reference to the property upon which they are levied; the object
of the act being to stop at once all proceedings against the bankrupt in any other court, and to bring all matters and questions
between the bankrupt and his creditors into the bankrupt court
for final settlement.
Now if this is so, how is the question as to whether this was
exempt property material ? The creditors' right to prosecute their
attachment suits being taken away and their attachments being
dissolved, what claim have they by virtue of the attachments to
assert ?
The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, in In
re El8is, 1 B. R. 154, has given a like construction to the act,
and the District Court of South Carolina in In re ffambright, 2
B. R. 157, holds that the bankrupt is to be regarded as a purchaser of his exempt property, the consideration being the surrender of all his other property for the benefit of his creditors.
This view disposes of the motion of the creditors; but they insist
that the officer should not be required to give up the property
until his fees and charges upon it are paid, and there are some
cases to the effect that he is entitled to his fees, but not I think
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that he can refuse to deliver the property until they are paid.
For if the attachments by virtue of which he holds the property
are dissolved he has no means of enforcing his lien against the
property. He cannot sell it. His remedy, if he has a lien, is to
apply to this court to have it allowed and paid out of the assets
that may come into the assignee's hands, and this court could on
such an application make such an order as might appear just and
equitable in the premises ; but I do not think he can interpose
his lien as against the right of the officers of this court to the
possession, and withhold the property from them until it is paid.
Motion denied.
Saprerne Court of Iowa.
MANDERSHIED v. CITY OF DUBUQUE..
Where an injury is the combined result of a defect in a highway and an accident which occurred without the fault of the plaintiff though it deprived him at
the time of the injury of the power of exercising the usual care and prudence of
a traveller, the plaintiff is not in pari delicto and may recover from the town.
Plaintiff averred that lie was driving a sleigh and his horse becoming frightened
and unmanageable without his fault, ran away, threw plaintiff out of the sleigh,

and stepping into a hole in the highway, broke its leg.
of action was set forth.

Held, that a good cause

THIS was an action to recover damages on account of an injury to plaintiff's horse, by reason of. a defective bridge, a part
of a street of said city.
The petition alleged that plaintiff was driving his team of horses
and sleigh through the streets of the city, when the horses
became frightened and ran away, and without the fault of plaintiff became unmanageable, ran towards said bridge, and threw
plaintiff out of the sleigh; and in crossing said bridge, one of the
horses stepped through a hole, negligently permitted, &c., by
defendant whereby its leg was broken, &c. The petition averred
due care and diligence of plaintiff in driving his team, and that
the defect in the bridge, whereby he sustained said loss, was in the
travelled roadway, &c.
Defendant demurred to the petition, because it showed that the
horses were beyond the control of plaintiff, and that he was not
exercising due care in their management, at the time of the
injury.
The demurrer was sustained, and plaintiff appealed.
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S. P. Adams and W. Chandler, for the appellant.
E. MCeney, for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
B0c3K, J.-Where one is injured in person, or property, by a
defect of the highway whereon he is travelling, he cannot recover
therefor, unless he used such care as persons of common prudence
generally exercise. In such a case the plaintiff must show, not
only that the highway was not safe, but that he, at the time,
was exercising ordinary prudence and care. If he was not, under
the doctrine, in par delicto, he cannot maintain an action for
the injury: 2 Hilliard on Torts 403.
But the action may be supported although the primary cause
is an accident, as the breaking of the carriage or harness, the violent running away of the horses, or the like, if the accident occurred without the fault of the party: 2 Hilliard 404; Palmer
v. Inhabitantsof Andover, 2 Cush. 609 ; .Howardv. North Bridgewater, 16 Pick. 189; Kelsey v. Clover, 15 Verm. 708; Yunt v.
Pownall, 9 Id. 411; .Fosterv. Dixfield, 6 Shep. 380; Verrill v.
Minott, 31 Me. 299.
In this case the primary cause of the injury was the fright and
running away of the horses: if these had not happened the injury
would not have occurred. But it is averred in the petition that
they happened without fault of the plaintiff. The team becoming
unmanageable, he was thrbwn from the sleigh; his care, prudence,
and exertion had no effect to prevent this primary accident. The
horses were thereby placed beyond his control, and he was utterly
unable to exercise any care over them which would have averted
the injury. By the neglect of the defendant the bridge was in
such a condition that it resulted in the loss of plaintiff's horse.
Plaintiff at the time was guilty of no negligence. It is therefore
not a case in pari delicto.
But it is urged that plaintiff was not at the moment of the injury exercising care and prudence; that is true, because, without
his own fault, he was in a condition that rendered it impossible
for him to use care. The rule requires the exercise of care, skill,
and prudence only where it is possible. If the injured party is in
a condition that renders it impossible, it would be absurd to deny
him redress because he did not do that which he could not do.
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It -will not be denied that horses and cattle may, under certain
circumstances, be permitted in the highways without being under
the immediate control of their owners. At certain seasons the
law permits them to run at large. If in crossing a bridge or in
passing upon a highway they are injured on account of the bad
condition in which either should be negligently kept, could it
with reason be claimed that because no care *was at the time
exercised over them by their owner, therefore he could not recover
from the party otherwise liable? Such a claim would be manifestly absurd; yet supported by the same reason as the defence
in this case.
Suppose plaintiff had been with his team at ike moment of the
injury, and the uncontrollable condition of his horses prevented the
exercise 'of any care; according to the doctrine contended for he
could recover. We can see no difference between that case and the
one made by the petitioner, where he was equally without fault,
and effectually renderedcpowerless to exercise prudence and care by
an accident which he wts unable to avert. These views it is
believed are supported by the authorities Iabove cited, and especially by Palmer v. The Inhabitants of Andover, and Howard
v. North Bridgewater. In -Davisv. The Inhabitants of Dudley,
4 Allen 557, the only authority cited by defendants, a contrary
doctrine is recognised.
The error in this case is, we conceive, in extending the rule
requiring care and prudence on -the part of the person sustaining
the injury, to cases where their exercise is impossible. The true
foundation of the rule is believed to be in the doctrine in pari
delicto. If those whose duty it is to keep the highway in repair
fail to do so, it will not justify persons travelling thereon in driving voluntarily or negligently into the pitfalls culpably left there.
If they do so they must suffer the consequence of their foolish or
careless acts, for they are equally guilty of negligence or wrong
with those whose duty it is to repair the highway. But the case
is very different where the traveller by an accident, or for other
cause not under his control, becomes incapable of exercising care
and thereby falls into the pit negligently left. In the case last
referred to it is held that because the plaintiff could not exercise.
care over his horses, which had broken from his control, he could
not recover. Stated in other words, the rule of the case is this:
the defendant is guilty of negligence; the plaintiff could not exer-
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cise care; because of these facts uniting, plaintiff sustains loss;
therefore defendant is not liable: or in other terms as follows:
The defendant negligently permits a pit in the highway; it was
impossible for plaintiff to use care to keep his horses out of it,
therefore defendant was not liable. The doctrine of the case seems
to be against reason, and absurd in its result. The opinion attempts
to reconcile Palmer v. The Inhabitants of Andover with the rule.
It recognises and disposes of ifoward v. NorthBridqewater by the
remark that the case was decided on other grounds. This remark
as to the last case .appears to be true. The point was presented
by the facts, but seems not to have been controverted by the defendant, and was recognised by the court. The effort to reconcile
Palmer v. The Inhabitants of Andover with the doctrine of the
decision is more unshecessful than the attempt to overthrow the
authority of Howardv. North Bridgewater. In the first-mentioned
case, by an accident the horse, while descending a hill, became
detached from the carriage, which of its own momentum was propelled into a mill-pond with the plaintiff in it. It was claimed
that defendant was liable for the injury, because of neglect in not
naintaining proper barriers between the road and the pond. The
opinion in .Davis v. Dudley states that inasmuch' as the plaintiff
in the other case, up to the moment of the injury, was exercising
care, on that ground defendant was held liable. We are unable
to find such reason in the opinion of the court making the ruling.
The following extract from the decision appears to embody the
true rule: "It seems to us that where the loss is a combined
result of an accident and of the defect in the road, and the
damage would not have been sustained but for the defect,
although the primary cause be a pure accident, yet if there be no
fault or negligence on the part of the plaintiff, if the accident
be one which common prudence and sagacity could not have foreseen or provided against, the town is liable."
The court immediately adds: "This doctrine in no respect
conflicts with the well-settled rule requiring the plaintiff to use
ordinary care and diligence, and that without showing this he
cannot recover, though the road be defective, and the damage be
occasioned by the combined effect of a defective road and want
of care and skill in avoiding injury." This sentence is the foundation of the following remarks in -Davisv. Dudley: "Up to the
very moinent of its occurrence (the injury) the plaintiffs continued
to exercise due care, otherwise they could not have maintained
VOL.
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their action; for the court carefully and distinctly add to the
stateihent of the principle of law relative to the effect of combined
causes, that the doctrine laid down on the subject in no degree
conflicts with the well-settled rule requiring the plaintiff to use
ordinary care and diligence, and without showing this they could
not recover." Now this criticism is just, if the court in Palmerv.
Andover shall be understood to say that the plaintiff must be
held to the exercise of care and diligence, even though an accident, which is the primary cause of the injury, renders it impossible, that if the accident which, combined with the defect in the
road, produced the injury was of such a character so great, so
effective in its results, as to take from plaintiff power to act-if you
please, to deprive him of consciousness-so that he was incapable
of exercising care and diligence, the defendant is not liable. It
cannot be that such is the court's meaning. In the words of the
opinion the plaintiff cannot recover, though the road be defective,
and the damage be occasioned by the combined effect of a defective road and want of care and skill in avoiding the injury.
To charge one with want of care and skill, he must be capable
of exercising these qualities. One cannot be charged with negligence, who is unable to be careful and prudent. We presume,
therefore, that the court uses the expression, " want of care and
skill," as applicable to one who has ability and opportunity to
exercise care and skill, yet fails to do so. The opinion in
Davis v. Dudley seems to regard it as equally applicable to one
not present when the injury is sustained, or who is powerless to
exercise care and skill; and herein, we think, is the error of the
ruling in the case. So far as the case at bar is concerned, let
it be supposed that plaintiff had remained in the sleigh, and exercised all the care he could over uncontrollable horses, upon any
rational presumption could the injury have been averted?
It indeed seems that the reasoning which makes the plaintiff's
right to recover depend upon the fact of his presence at the
moment of his injury, even though he had no power to avert it,
which in effect is the result of the doctrine of Davis v. Dudley,
as applied in this case, is more ingenious than sound, practical,
and just in its results.
In the language of Palmer v. Andover, it is ii the ordinary
course of events, and consistent with the reasonable degree of
prudence on the part of the traveller, that accidents Will occur,.
that horses may be frightened, that harness may break, or a bolt

